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A map showing the reception quality of radio broadcasts in the North, along with the 
source of the transmissions (1953). The Alouette project was designed to overcome 
situations like this through the production and analysis of the visual records known as 
ionograms. Note the arrows marked "Canada " near the lower right corner. 
Source: National Archives of Canada, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Record 
Group 41 (hereafter NAC, RG 41), vol. 127, file 5, part 2, F.H. Collins, "Radio in the 
Yukon Territory: A Brief Presented to the Royal Commission on Broadcasting, " April 
1956,4-5. 
Laboratory Cultures 
Edward Jones-Imhotep 
York University 
Résumé: Cet essai se sert des cultures visuelles et matérielles de deux 
laboratoires afin d'engager une discussion historiographique sur ce que signifie 
écrire l'histoire de la science et de la technologie au Canada. Il emploie un sujet 
potentiellement familier, la conception et la construction du satellite Alouette, 
pour illustrer la façon dont la discipline pourrait se défaire de sa préoccupation 
consciente pour les découvertes et les innovations et se concentrer plutôt sur une 
exploration révisée de la question : qu'y a-t-il de canadien dans la technologie et 
la science canadiennes ? 
Abstract: This essay uses the visual and material cultures of two laboratories as 
a way of initiating an historiographical discussion about what it means to write 
the history of science and technology in Canada. It uses a potentially familiar 
topic—the conception and construction of the Alouette satellite—to illustrate 
how the discipline might shed its self-conscious preoccupation with discoveries 
and innovations, and instead focus its attention on a revised exploration of the 
question: what is Canadian about Canadian science and technology? 
There is metaphysics in our histories. In the subjects we interrogate, in 
the questions we pose, in the answers we seek, we make crucial 
presumptions about the nature of science, the essence of technology, and 
the character of historical processes. We privilege institutions over in-
dividuals, politics over practices, mathematics over material cultures. We 
alternate between continuities and ruptures, failures and successes, 
innovation and stasis; and we use these distinctions to argue about what 
could have been, what should have been, and what never was. Yet all too 
often we take for granted the assumptions of our craft. We ignore 
alternate histories, different modes of interrogation that question how we 
treat the relationships between knowledge and nation, nature and artifice, 
technology and culture. And in doing so, we deny ourselves the op-
portunity to speak to wider concerns in the history of science and 
technology, to address deeper and less self-indulgent questions: What 
kinds of histories might science and technology have? How do we begin 
writing about the interrelations between natures, humans, and machines? 
© Scientia Canadensis 28 (2005): 7-26 
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In what follows, I am interested in one such alternate history. It in-
terests me not as a source of simple and ready answers to complex 
questions, but as a means of helping to launch a long-overdue discussion 
about the historiography of Canadian science and technology.1 The 
subject may be familiar: On 29 September 1962, at 06:05 hours, amid a 
string of upper atmospheric nuclear tests and growing cold-war tensions, 
the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration launched a 
modified ballistic missile from the Pacific Missile Test Range in 
California. Its payload consisted of a 145-kilogram satellite designed and 
built by the Canadian Defence Research Telecommunications 
Establishment (DRTE), a defence research organization made up of three 
research laboratories—the Communications Laboratory, the Radio 
Physics Laboratory, and the Electronics Laboratory—and located just 
northwest of Ottawa along the Ottawa River. The project's goal was to 
study the portion of the upper atmosphere known as the ionosphere for a 
period of one year. At a time when satellites regularly failed after only 
months in orbit, the Alouette satellite (known by the codename S-27 
before its launch) would continue sending its vital data through radiation 
disturbances and meteorite impacts for a period often years. 
Historical accounts have since seen the satellite in various guises—as 
scientific instrument, as industrial prototype, as cold-war status symbol.2 
But no image of the object, or of the project that created it, has been as 
pervasive as the one that places Alouette at the beginning of a 
technological trajectory leading inevitably to communications satellites, 
and therefore to reliable national telecommunications. The satellite stands 
as a powerful symbol of innovation and success, but above all, as a 
symbol of technological integrity in a nation that has long equated 
reliable communications with national identity and cultural survival.3 
1. Don MacLeod has argued that this debate has been a long time coming. See "A 
Maturing of Purpose: Recent Publications in the History of Technology and the Physical 
Sciences in Canada," Acadiensis 20 (1990): 225-243. 
2. See, for example, Doris H. Jelly, Canada: 25 Years in Space (Montreal: National 
Museum of Science and Technology, 1988); Theodore R. Hartz and Irvine Paghis, 
Spacebound (Ottawa: Government of Canada, Department of Communications, 1982); 
R. E. Barrington, "Canadian Space Activities in the Past Quarter Century," Canadian 
Aeronautics and Space Journal 25 (1979): 153-69. 
3. For two examples of the often implicit way Alouette has been written into the history 
of communications satellites, see Robert Babe, Telecommunications in Canada: 
Technology, Industry, and Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 
221-222; and Bert C. Blevis, "The Pursuit of Equality: The Role of the Ionosphere and 
Satellite Communications in Canadian Development," in Beyond the Ionosphere: Fifty 
Years of Satellite Communications, ed. Andrew J. Butrica (Washington, D.C.: NASA 
History Office, 1997), 195-203. 
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For all their value in pointing to the future significance of Alouette, 
accounts like this form part of a mode of history that I want to suspend 
for a moment. Specifically, I want to question the way these histories 
constitute their subject. Because they take communication satellites as 
their endpoint, these histories trace what we might call the 'stable 
technologies' of the satellite—thermal blankets, telemetry transmitters, 
solar cells, antennas—the technical features common to a wide range of 
satellites, features that transcend any one satellite's immediate purpose. 
In homogenizing the string of Canadian satellites running from Alouette 
to Anik, they ignore the complex and sometimes conflicting ideas, 
practices and priorities that attended each device. More seriously, the 
accounts are rooted in a kind of technological determinism that I would 
like to avoid.4 Here, machines and engineers, institutions and politics, 
funding schemes and lab directors furnish the gears and springs of a 
clockwork world; their actions lead us inevitably through an 
unproblematic technological succession from scientific instruments to 
communication satellites. But the laboratories in which Alouette was 
imagined, designed and built become interesting only for their 
contributions to a series of extraordinary machines that would finally 
realize the dream of reliable nationwide communications. 
What, then, if we changed our focus? What if we situate the satellite 
not within the narrow continuum of technological family resemblances to 
which it has been ascribed, but instead within the complex and evolving 
scientific, instrumental and engineering traditions that conceived and 
constructed it? What if we see the satellite not as what it will become, but 
as what it was meant to be—a generator of crucial scientific images shot 
through with issues of national identity and integrity, and the politics of 
the Cold War? The immediate goal of the satellite project that produced 
Alouette was to generate what were arguably the most important 
inscriptions of upper atmospheric physics in the 1950s and 1960s—the 
graphic records known as ionograms. These images, standing between 
the interests of ionospheric physics and radio engineering, were crucial to 
the Canadian post-war projects of national sovereignty and identity. 
Before satellites ever promised to extend reliable communications to the 
Canadian North, ionograms stood as the best guarantors of an integral 
nation. A material and cultural history of the ionogram, then, is what we 
are after. We have to make the ionogram central if we want to grasp why 
4. For a more general discussion of technological determinism, see Donald MacKenzie, 
éd., The Social Shaping of Technology, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 
1999), 3-6; and Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History?: 
The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994). 
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producing these images from a satellite was crucial rather than incidental. 
The satellite is still important here, but it must form part of a longer 
tradition of visual representations in upper atmospheric research rooted in 
the technological priorities and the emerging material culture of the Cold 
War. 
Without cutting the issue too thin, then, I want to focus on S-27 rather 
than on Alouette. In doing so, I want (perhaps counterintuitively) to de-
centre a number of historical objects that have been privileged until 
now—the satellite itself, its seemingly phenomenal successes, and the 
Communications Laboratory responsible for proposing it. Instead, I 
would like to focus on the cultures of DRTE's other two laboratories— 
the Radio Physics Laboratory, whose work had relied for a decade on the 
ionogram and the information it provided, and the Electronics La-
boratory, which would engineer and partly construct the artifact. There 
are thus two moves that we want to perform. First, we need to locate the 
satellite within an ionogram-based visual culture rooted in the Radio 
Physics Laboratory; and secondly we want to see the satellite as part of a 
reliability-based material and engineering culture, rooted in transistor 
electronics and advanced weapons systems, which dominated the work of 
the Electronics Laboratory. The standard story severs the satellite from 
both of these traditions. In reconnecting it to the practices and concepts 
that produced it, the satellite becomes the occasion to explore these two 
laboratory cultures and to see what they can tell us about how we might 
approach the historical study of science and technology in Canada. If we 
shift our attention away from the obvious outer technology of the satellite 
to focus instead on its graphic products and the technologies that 
produced them, the laboratories of DRTE emerge as the sites of as-
tonishing cold-war debates over the relations between knowledge and 
nation, nature and artifice, humans and machines. They give us insight 
not only into the history of Canadian science and technology, but into the 
broader realms of Canadian history and of science studies writ large. In 
order to begin engaging those larger spheres, however, we need to push 
into the places of physics and engineering in order to see what the act of 
producing ionograms meant for DRTE, and how the anxieties over the 
production and integrity of those records were partly addressed through 
the visual and material culture of war. 
Laboratory Cultures 
Over the last two decades, the history of science has begun examining 
the social and cultural functions of laboratories in gaining both cognitive 
and technological control over the world outside their walls. Scholars 
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have demonstrated, for example, how the late-Victorian Cavendish Labo-
ratory helped buttress the integrity of the British Empire through the 
calibration of electrical standards used in telegraphy, or how the Parisian 
linguistics laboratory of Third Empire France, and its graphic representa-
tions of spoken language, granted the metropolis leverage over the 
provinces and their patois. Historically and historiographically, the labo-
ratory and its products provide a particularly rich site in which to observe 
the complex interactions of science and culture as well as their role in the 
consolidation of nations and empires.5 
The laboratories at DRTE participated in this broader tradition. The 
Establishment had originally been formed through the merging of two 
laboratories—the Radio Physics Laboratory (RPL), created in 1947 to 
deal with problems of radio propagation in high Northern latitudes and 
particularly in the strategically crucial Canadian North; and the Elec-
tronics Laboratory (EL), created in 1950 to provide technical support for 
the RPL and to carry out "anticipatory research" in advanced electronics. 
DRTE itself formed part of a much broader research effort, spurred by 
the post-war enthusiasm for science and coordinated by the Canadian 
Defence Research Board, to provide 'a unique contribution' to the re-
search activities of the West by focusing on fields in which Canada 
possessed special talent or facilities, and especially in those fields best-
suited to its geographic position.6 Alongside the broader projects of the 
Defence Research Board—climatic investigations, topographical analy-
ses, entomological experiments—DRTE would try to establish reliable 
telecommunications to the Canadian North by exerting cognitive control 
over the ionosphere above it. In 1957 the RPL and EL were joined by the 
Communications Laboratory (CL), where the ionospheric physics of the 
Radio Physics Laboratory met the advanced technology of Electronics 
Lab. The satellite project that emerged from the Communications Labo-
ratory in early 1959 was, at its most basic level, an attempt to extend the 
tradition of radio-physical investigations begun with RPL by drawing on 
5. For the case of the Cavendish, see Simon Schaffer, "Late Victorian Metrology and 
Its Instrumentation: A Manufactory of Ohms," in The Science Studies Reader, ed. Mario 
Biagioli (New York: Routledge, 1999), 457-478; on the linguistics laboratory of Etienne 
Jules Marey, see Robert Brain, "Standards and Semiotics," in Inscribing Science: 
Scientific Texts and the Materiality of Communication, ed. Timothy Lenoir (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), 249-284. Also, on the now classic case of Louis 
Pasteur, see Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1988). 
6. Donald J. Goodspeed, A History of the Defence Research Board of Canada (Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer. 1958), 25. 
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the growing electronic expertise and material culture of the Electronics 
Lab. 
The Visual Cultures of the Radio Physics Laboratory 
The S-27 project built on a long tradition of ionospheric research at the 
Radio Physics Laboratory stretching back to the Second World War. 
RPL's roots lay in a small research unit assembled by the Royal Canadian 
Navy in 1941 to investigate radio disruptions in the North Atlantic and 
the peculiar ionospheric conditions believed to cause them. These disrup-
tions—often severe, sometimes total blackouts—wreaked havoc on 
wartime radio and direction-finding circuits in the North Atlantic, 
thwarting Allied telecommunications and facilitating the work of German 
U-boat commanders. Housed in Section 6 of the Navy's Operational 
Intelligence Centre (OIC/6), a division concerned with code-breaking, 
counterintelligence and anti-submarine warfare, the unit was placed 
under the leadership of Frank T. Davies, a meteorologist and Welsh 
émigré who had been introduced to ionospheric research through 
geophysics and meteorology.7 Davies had served on a number of 
scientific expeditions to the Arctic and Antarctic in the late 1920s and 
throughout the 1930s, he carried out meteorological and geophysical 
measurements, particularly of the magnetic, auroral and ionospheric phe-
nomena that fascinated him. Following a posting as director of the 
Carnegie Geophysical Observatory in Huancayo, Peru, in the late 1930s, 
he joined British Intelligence and was later seconded to OIC/6 from the 
National Research Council in the early years of the Second World War to 
oversee its ionospheric propagation programme. 
Davies' interests in geophysical measurements and atmospheric obser-
vations would stay with him all his life. Long after his professional duties 
had turned administrative, careful meteorological notes on temperature, 
wind properties, and precipitation would find their way into his diaries. 
More importantly for our purposes, Davies interests would shape the 
culture of the Radio Physics Laboratory from the time of its creation in 
1947.8 Under Davies's direction, OIC/6 mounted the first systematic 
7. Although meteorology is generally associated with the study of weather, it is actually 
a diverse field encompassing applied, dynamic and physical meteorology, aerology (the 
study of the free air not adjacent to the earth's surface) and aeronomy (which includes 
upper atmospheric physics and therefore ionospheric investigations). 
8. Davies's commitment to geophysical investigations as a means of improving 
communications after the war would perplex and sometimes enrage his military overseers, 
who came to see the postwar Radio Physics Laboratory as an academic luxury—an 
organization engaged in basic research, and therefore not a defence unit at all, but rather a 
purely scientific establishment. See biographical notes on Frank T. Davies, held at the 
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Canadian studies of the ionosphere. From tiny ionospheric field stations 
scattered across the country in the late 1940s, partially processed data 
made its way through virtually every communications medium in postwar 
Canada—telephone, telegraph, teletype, air mail, regular mail, confiden-
tial messenger and radio—to Davies's group in Ottawa.9 Using these data 
to improve wartime radio communications was by no means unique. 
What characterized the approach of Davies's group vis-à-vis British and 
American researchers (against which they defined themselves) was its 
emphasis on the physical and the causal, rather than the statistical and the 
correlative aspects of radio propagation.10 In a mantra that would guide 
the work of RPL for the next two decades, Davies argued that the path to 
reliable radio required a scientific excursion through the geophysics of 
high northern latitudes. 
Of all the field-station data used by Davies and his colleagues—ab-
sorption measurements, oblique incidence measurements, radio reception 
conditions, auroral observations—the most important by far were the 
measurements derived from ionograms. Since the mid-1920s, when 
Merle Tuve and Gregory Breit had begun using oscilloscopes and radar 
equipment to investigate ionospheric phenomena (before their respective 
entries into atomic physics), the notion of an 'experiment' in ionospheric 
research had quickly become associated with the production of a visual 
record. The instrument that produced that record was known as an ionos-
onde—essentially a modified radar set that shared extensively in the 
material culture of its sibling.11 Through a series of timing, gating and 
Communications Research Centre, Ottawa (formerly the Defence Research Telecom-
munications Establishment). 
9. National Archives of Canada, Department of National Defence Record Group 24 
(hereafter NAC, RG 24) vol. 4058, file NSS 1078-13-8, vol. 1, "Notes on Discussion of 
Ionospheric Measurement and Radio Transmission Work of Laboratories at London, 
Sydney, and Washington, 30 December 1942 to 9 January 1943," 12 January 1943,3. 
10. This way of approaching radio problems—through physical and dynamical 
investigations rather than statistical correlations—would gain momentum after the war. 
As evidence that this approach characterized the work of Davies's group, Norwegian 
Defence Research Establishment (NRDE) adopted RPL's more 'scientific' approach to 
the problems of northern radio communications after a visit to RPL in 1955. See Olav 
Wicken, "Space Science and Technology in the Cold War: The Ionosphere, the Military, 
and Politics in Norway," History and Technology 13 (1997): 207-229. 
11. On the early history of ionospheric research and the role of visual images, see C. 
Stewart Gillmor, "Threshold to Space: Early Studies of the Ionosphere," in Space Science 
Comes of Age: Perspectives in the History of the Space Sciences, eds. Paul Hanle and Von 
del Chamberlain (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1981), 101-114. In the 
late 1940s, ionosondes were often assembled from surplus military radar equipment. 
Some have argued vigorously for the ionosonde as the initial step towards operational 
radar. Oswald Villard has claimed that Merle Tuve's observation that reflections from 
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amplifier circuits, the ionosonde emitted a series of pulses of gradually 
increasing frequency. These pulses traveled into the upper atmosphere 
where, depending on the electron density they encountered, they might be 
reflected back to the ionosonde's receiver before being fed to a cathode 
ray oscilloscope. Through careful measurements made directly on the 
oscilloscope, researchers could manually construct height-versus-
frequency (h'f) graphs of ionospheric propagation.12 Building on wartime 
improvements in radar technology, post-war instruments sought to 
automate the tracing process, first by focusing the oscilloscope image on 
35mm film while moving the film through a camera at constant speed; 
and later by adding two 'panoramic' displays, which automatically 
plotted the time delay (or virtual height) of the radio echoes against their 
frequency characteristics, thereby creating the same h'f curves as station 
technicians might, but without the difficulties and uncertainties of manual 
intervention.13 
The resulting records, known as "panoramic ionograms," quickly be-
came the preferred graphical tools in upper atmospheric physics and 
high-frequency communications. Like the bubble chamber image of 20th-
century microphysics, or the indicator diagram of 19th century thermo-
dynamics and engineering, the ionogram of the 1950s was iconic. Like so 
many scientific records, its appeal lay partly in its ability to render static 
the otherwise fleeting characteristics of nature, in the fact that it seemed 
to represent a "picture" of the ionosphere.14 By automating the construc-
tion of height-versus-frequency curves, the panoramic ionogram 
effectively transformed the process of ionospheric research from one 
rooted in tracing—either manual or mechanical in the case of the early 
ionosondes—to one based on seemingly instantaneous photography. Its 
planes were interfering with phase-path measurements in 1929 prompted radar 
development; see Oswald G. Villard, "The Ionospheric Sounder and its Place in the 
History of Radio Science," Radio Science 11 (1976): 858. C. Steward Gillmor has simi-
larly pointed out this significance of ionospheric research. 
12. The use of this system at Canadian ionospheric stations at the end of World War II is 
documented in the transcript of the Canadian Radio Wave Propagation Committee 
Conference. NAC, RG 24, vol. 3412, Canadian Radio Wave Propagation Committee 
Conference, 22-27 October 1945,27. 
13. Indeed, T.R. Gilliland, who introduced the automatic ionosonde in this form, claimed 
to do so in order to save time and labour, as well as to capture the details of an often 
rapidly-changing ionosphere. T.R. Gilliland, "Note on a Multifrequency Automatic 
Recorder of Ionospheric Heights," Bureau of Standards Journal of Research 11 (1933): 
561-566. 
14. This realist impulse in ionospheric research has been examined in Gillmor (note 11). 
For the case of 'sporadic E' ionization, see Kenneth Davies, "Ionospheric Radio 
Propagation," National Bureau of Standards Monograph, 80 (Washington, D.C.: National 
Bureau of Standards, 1965), 150. 
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ability to capture even the most fleeting characteristics of the ionosphere 
in a formalized graph allowed researchers to pore over them at length, 
analyzing, measuring, recording and incorporating its features into larger 
experimental results and theoretical conclusions.15 
For all its broad appeal, the ionogram became central to the specific 
practical and political cultures of the post-war RPL, and of DRTE's 
ionospheric and radio research more generally. It first of all appealed to 
the two principal groups making up RPL, ionospheric physicists like 
Davies and communications engineers. Each group read a single iono-
gram in different ways. Upper atmospheric physicists read the graphs 
backwards, as it were, through magneto-ionic theory, thermodynamics, 
and cosmic ray physics to assemble views of ionospheric structure and 
dynamics. Radio engineers, on the other hand, read the images forward, 
through the laws of optics and through a series of propagation theorems 
that converted scaled quantities into maximum usable frequencies, opti-
mal working frequencies and skip distances for communications cir-
cuits.16 The dual nature of the records, their ability to simultaneously 
speak to the interests of ionospheric and radio physicists alike, made 
them central to RPL's mission of establishing reliable northern commu-
nications through investigations of Canada's peculiar northern 
geophysics. 
But for RPL the ionogram was also the solution to problems in the 
place of experiment. Throughout the years immediately following World 
War II, the laboratory directed considerable resources against the trou-
bling effects of the northern and rural environment that the ionospheric 
field stations occupied. For the laboratory, the rigours of the field raised 
troubling epistemic difficulties. Frank Davies repeatedly argued to his 
15. For a fascinating account of the similar role of recordings in the history of 
linguistics, see Brain. Bruno Latour has pointed to the broader importance of 
measurement in relation to two dimensional images. In his essay "Drawing things 
together," he explains how the result of the merging of image and geometry is "that we 
can work on paper with rulers and numbers, and combinations of numbers and tables can 
be used which are still easier to handle than words or silhouettes. You cannot measure the 
sun, but you can measure a photograph of the sun with a ruler... This is what I call, for 
want of a better term, the second-degree advantage of inscriptions, or the surplus-value 
that is gained through their capitalization."; Bruno Latour, "Drawing Things Together." in 
Representation in Scientific Practice, eds. Michael Lynch and Steve Woolgar 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 46-47. 
16. Some have suggested that the radio scientific roots of ionospheric research led to a 
phenomenological approach to ionospheric physics. See Davies, 153; S.A. Bowhill and 
E.R. Schmerling, "The Distribution of Electrons in the Ionosphere," in Advances in 
Electronics and Electron Physics, 15, ed. L. Marton (New York: Academic Press, 1961), 
256-326; and Gillmor, 101-102. 
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superiors that the instruments of the field stations could produce good 
records, but required "constant skilled supervision."17 Training had to be 
carried out on site, Davies lamented, "sometimes by men who have not 
had sufficient training themselves. Inaccuracy and serious errors in data 
have occurred because of this."18 The itinerant nature of the northern 
workforce added to these difficulties. The panoramic ionosonde, which 
automated the production of ionograms, was meant to solve the problem 
of producing records reliably. But in many ways, it only displaced the 
problem of reliability. The graph captured more phenomena more relia-
bly, but it made the field operators' job of reading the ionogram much 
harder. Furthermore, the accepted techniques for reading ionograms in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s, techniques developed by British and 
American researchers in the decades before the war and based on the 
much simpler ionograms from temperate latitudes, treated many of the 
characteristic phenomena on Canadian records as aberrations. The stan-
dards of ionographic interpretation in the late 1940s, when RPL began its 
work, did not know how to treat these records and others like them. In 
response, RPL launched a programme to develop its own authoritative 
rules for reading high-latitude ionograms, rules that would be adopted 
internationally in 1957 for the International Geophysical Year.19 With the 
production and reading regimes intact, the ionogram could now represent 
the peculiar effects of the turbulent high-latitude ionosphere—the spread 
echoes, Z-modes, and polar spurs that distinguished the "Canadian iono-
sphere" from that of the U.S.A. or Britain—furnishing the visual 
evidence behind arguments for Canadian distinctiveness into the 1960s. 
Through the production and circulation of ionograms, the Laboratory's 
work of extending reliable communications to the Canadian North was 
materially, socially, and culturally structured by two dimensions: its total 
dependence on two-dimensional representations of peculiar ionospheric 
17. NAC, RG 24, vol. 3414, file 468-3-3, Frank T. Davies, "Minutes of Canadian Radio 
Wave Propagation Committee, Ionospheric Propagation Sub-committee," 22 May 1944, 
2. 
18. NAC, RG 24, vol. 83-84/167, file 7401-1710, Frank T. Davies, Memorandum to 
Vice-Director General, Defence Research Board, 16 July 1947,1. 
19. The authors of the IGY manual would admit that the standard scaling techniques had 
proved "far from satisfactory for world-wide use." See "Manual on Ionosphere Vertical 
Soundings," Annals of the IGY, 3, part 1, eds. J. W. Wright, R. W. Knecht and K. Davies, 
(London: Pergamon Press, 1957), 111. The choice of these records was due partly to the 
geographical distribution of the laboratories (primarily American and European) that had 
developed the interpretation practices, and partly because in the particular simplicity of 
these records researchers hoped to more readily find a suggestion of the universal. See 
J.A. Ratcliffe, "The Formation of the Ionosphere: Ideas of the Early Years (1925-1955)," 
Journal of Atmospheric and Terrestrial Physics 36 (1974): 2167. 
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phenomena and on the network of distant field stations that provided 
them. 
Through these transformations in the practical and material cultures of 
the Radio Physics Laboratory and its field stations, ionograms had by the 
late 1950s become central to the politics, culture and practices of DRTE, 
and to the Establishment's claims about Canadian identity and geophysi-
cal particularity. DRTE researchers had put enormous efforts into turning 
the ionogram into an incredibly reliable and authoritative medium for 
representing the ionosphere above Canada. For all their utility and 
ubiquity in the late 1950s, however, ionograms possessed one crucial 
limitation: they could only furnish direct information on the so-called 
'bottomside ionosphere,' the portion of the ionosphere lying roughly 
between 100 and 500 km above the earth.20 Ironically, the same 
characteristics of radio propagation that made the ionogram possible 
denied researchers any direct knowledge about the region that lay 
beyond—the so-called "topside ionosphere". The purpose of the satellite 
project proposed in 1957 by the Communications Laboratory (formed 
from a nucleus of RPL researchers) was to extend the production of 
ionograms, along with the familiar and reliable scientific practices that 
surrounded them, to the investigation of this 'topside ionosphere'.21 
The ionogram was not incidental here—it was central. For the 
ionospheric physicists and communications engineers at DRTE, the S-27 
project was the culmination of an experimental tradition that stretched 
back almost two decades. In a proposal to their superiors at the Defence 
Research Board, CL researchers argued that a satellite orbiting at 1000 
km and 80° inclination to the geographic equator could create an icono-
graphie symmetry in ionospheric research, allowing the ionosphere to be 
20. The ground-based ionogram will only render a comprehensive picture for an 
ionosphere of monotonically increasing electron density. This is because each pulse from 
the ionosonde propagates through the atmosphere until it encounters a region of the 
ionosphere with electron density: N=jtmf/e . Here, the radiation would be completely 
reflected, and the range to the reflecting region could be obtained by measuring the time 
delay between emitted pulse and received echo. Beyond a 'critical f, corresponding to the 
maximum electron density of the ionosphere, radio waves continued out into space. Any 
features of the ionosphere lying beyond this region, technically known as the F2 peak, 
would not be captured by the ionogram. In fact, through its own limitations, the ionogram 
actually helped define the 'bottomside' ionosphere, whose limits actually varied 
according to geophysical conditions and their diurnal and seasonal variations. On the 
history of the ionospheric layers, see Gillmor, 102,105-106. 
21. This was intended, in part, to avoid the difficulties of data use like those described by 
John Krige in his discussion of the European Meteorological Satellite. See John Krige, 
"Crossing the Interface from R&D to Operational Use: The Case of the European 
Meteorological Satellite," Technology and Culture, 41 (2000): 27-50, on pages 28-29. 
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inscribed, for the first time ever, from the ground out to the borders of 
space through the cognitively dependable ionogram.22 The nagging ques-
tion of how to produce these crucial images reliably, in the hostile envi-
ronment at the borders of space rather than the isolated spaces of the 
North, would fall to the Electronics Laboratory of DRTE. 
The Material Cultures of the Electronics Laboratory 
For two decades after the Second World War, the Radio Physics Labo-
ratory had been deeply concerned with the reliable production, circulation 
and interpretation of ionograms. Those concerns had always centred on 
the large and unwieldy ground-based ionosondes used at the field 
stations. Although the satellite project marked a shift in the material 
culture of ionographic production from vacuum tube-powered, ground-
based sounders to solid-state driven, space-based ionosondes, the 
concerns over generating ionograms in inhospitable environments 
crossed that divide. But how did an organization like the Electronics 
Laboratory, completely inexperienced in satellite construction, approach 
the problem of producing the ionogram reliably from space? 
Technologies are not automatically reliable entities; and scientific 
instruments are no exception. Despite years of scholarship that treated the 
knowledge-producing capacity of instruments as relatively unproblem-
atic, over the past two decades we have seen again and again how social 
and cultural contexts help transform instruments into "transparent" tools 
of science.23 That same literature has repeatedly suggested how vast areas 
of post-war research—particle physics, solid-state computing, medical 
22. On the orbital considerations for S-27, see NAC, John Chapman Fonds (MG 31 
J 143), vol. 9, John Chapman, "Proposal for a Sweep Frequency Ionospheric Sounder for 
Installation in a Satellite," 1958,2. 
23. Simon Schaffer has examined at length this 'transparency' in relation to Newton's 
prisms, and his experiments on the nature of light; see Simon Schaffer, "Glass Works: 
Newton's Prisms and the Uses of Experiment," in The Uses of Experiment: Studies in the 
Natural Sciences, eds. David Gooding, Trevor Pinch, and Simon Schaffer (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 67-104; Bruno Latour has used the term "black-
boxing" to describe the process by which instruments are made unproblematic. See Bruno 
Latour, "Give Me a Laboratory and I will Raise the World," in Science Observed: New 
Perspectives on the Social Study of Science, eds. Karin D. Knorr-Cetina and Michael 
Mulkay (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1983), 141-170. Also Steven Shapin and 
Simon Schaffer have studied the often intense work of negotiation and coordination 
involved in establishing the air-pump as a reliable tool of natural philosophy; see 
Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985). 
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electronics—were made possible by the machinery of war.24 And space 
science, with its roots in weapons engineering and military organization, 
benefitted disproportionately from these connections.25 Modified ballistic 
missiles carried nuclear warheads and scientific probes alike into the 
upper atmosphere and beyond. Technologies designed for the nuclear 
battlefield—radiation shields, telemetry transmitters, Geiger counters, 
miniature electronics—entered into weapons systems and space experi-
ments alike. The inexperience of the members of DRTE in space 
electronics, this literature suggests, is ultimately less important than their 
deep immersion in the material and epistemic dimensions of a military 
culture of reliability, underwriting vast spheres of cold-war technology. 
If we approach the S-27 project as a novelty, as the launching point in a 
long line of satellite projects, we risk missing the way it was rooted in 
profound concerns over the reliability of technologies during the Cold 
War. In situating it within these concerns, however, we need to avoid 
appealing to a monolithic and undifferentiated military culture of reli-
ability. The Cold War demanded that electronic technologies be ever-
reliable. In doing so, it changed the way that electronics was conceived, 
developed and even understood. But rather than creating immediate 
consensus, the Cold War spawned competing visions of what caused 
unreliability in electronics and how it might be eliminated. The S-27 
satellite was one historically specific answer to the problems of reliable 
electronics in the late 1950s. We want to avoid treating the satellite as a 
24. Peter Galison, for example, has demonstrated the connections between the material 
culture of war and the material culture of microphysics; see P. Galison, Image and Logic: 
A Material Culture of Modern Physics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997), 
especially chapters 4 and 6. For the adoption of radar technology in medical imaging, see 
E. Yoxen, "Seeing with Sound: A Study of the Development of Medical Images," in The 
Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and 
History of Technology, eds. T. Pinch and W. Bijker (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 281-
303. 
25. See B. Hevly, Basic Research within a Military Context: The Naval Research 
Laboratory and the Foundations of Extreme Ultraviolet and X-Ray Astronomy, 1923-
1960 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1987). For the specific case of post-
war rocket research in the U.S., see D. DeVorkin, Science with a Vengeance: How the 
Military Created the US Space Sciences After World War II (New York: Springer-Verlag, 
1992). The links between weapons laboratories and space science has been carefully laid 
out by Clayton Koppes in his study of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. See C. Koppes, JPL 
and the American Space Program: A History of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). Walter McDougall explains the common grounding 
of both enterprises in the military-industrial complex; See The Heavens and the Earth: A 
Political History of the Space Age (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 157-236. And Olav 
Wicken has studied the military connection in Norwegian space science during the Cold 
War, see Wicken, "Space Science." 
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generic technology and instead see it as a particular and contingent 
product of the engineering culture of the Electronics Laboratory—one out 
of a number of historically specific alternatives to the pressing concerns 
about the trustworthiness of electronics. 
Throughout the 1950s, the question of how to construct reliable 
electronic equipment had enormous relevance beyond the satellite 
project, beyond the Electronics Lab, even beyond DRTE. It lay at the 
centre of a "reliability crisis" that afflicted both Western and Soviet 
defence establishments early in the decade.26 Report after report argued 
that the growing electronic infrastructures of the Cold War—the increas-
ingly complex systems of radar and atomic weapons, gimlaying and 
guided missiles, surveillance and communications—were massively 
unreliable. One report from 1950, for example, suggested that a full two-
thirds of Western military electronic equipment might be malfunction-
ing.27 At the core of the crisis lay practical and epistemological concerns: 
What were the practices and concepts through which engineers might 
create reliability? How could the reliability of electronic equipment best 
be known? 
Two main answers to these questions emerged over the course of the 
1950s. The early view of the reliability crisis was dominated by what we 
might call a "monist" perspective, which viewed reliability as a problem 
of individual electronic parts. It had entered the U.S. ballistic missile 
programme mainly through émigré German rocket engineers, and was 
adopted at the highest levels of the Canadian Armed Services in the early 
1950s. It carried analytical force—at its simplest level, the reliability of a 
system is given by the product of the individual part reliabilities; and it 
rested on a quasi-ontological foundation that saw individual electronic 
devices as atomic constituents, "an item which cannot be disassembled 
without destroying its identity".28 Combined with the obvious materiality 
of electronic failure (the fact that failures manifested themselves physi-
cally in electronic parts), the monists argued convincingly for one causal 
explanation of the reliability crisis, one view of where the reliable func-
tioning of electronic equipment resided. Why did a piece of electronic 
equipment stop working? Simply put, it stopped working because one or 
several of its fundamental constituents had ceased to function properly. 
26. NAC, RG 24, vol. 2484, file 801-E447-1, part 1, "A Proposed RCAF Policy and 
Organization for System Reliability" (24 June 1963). 
27. Keith Henney, éd., Reliability Factors for Ground Electronic Equipment (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1956), 1-1. 
28. Morris Halio, "Improving Electronic Reliability," IRE Transactions on Military 
Electronics MIL-5 (1961): 12. 
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By the mid-1950s, however, that view of reliability had begun to come 
under sustained attack from what we might call a dualist programme, 
which instead focused on both electronic parts and the larger circuits in 
which parts operated. The dualist criticisms emerged most forcefully in 
the late 1950s, in the wake of Sputnik, from isolated sections of the 
Department of National Defence, and particularly from the Air Material 
Command (AMC) of the Royal Canadian Air Force. Its most vocal 
champion within the Canadian military was an engineer and leading 
member of the Air Material Command named Chester Soucy. For Soucy, 
one of the major errors of the monist view was that it focused too heavily 
on a category of electronic failure known as "catastrophic failures"— 
incidents in which equipment failed to operate altogether rather than 
simply malfunctioning.29 The focus on catastrophic failures "due to their 
dramatic obviousness" had caused military planners and even engineers 
to neglect the "less dramatic but more prevalent problem of malfunctions 
due to gradual degradation of parts."30 The greater problem for reliability, 
Soucy maintained, was with the design of circuits, the larger electronic 
environments in which individual parts experienced their catastrophic 
failures. By Soucy's lights, the monist programme might possibly ensure 
the reliability of relatively simple military electronic equipment; but it 
simply could not do so for the dizzyingly complex electronic systems 
demanded by the RCAF.31 Guidance systems and proximity fuses for 
missiles, fire control systems for supersonic aircraft, even instrumentation 
for satellites—these systems, Soucy argued, demanded a level of reliabil-
ity surpassing anything the monists could offer. Granted, catastrophic 
failures were materially localized in individual parts; but in areas like 
radar and missiles, unreliability had to be conceived more broadly, and 
had to consider failures of design. 
The Electronics Laboratory was created six months before the outbreak 
of the Korean War. Its mission was to conduct what officials called 
'anticipatory research' into military electronics—investigations into 
advanced communications, electronic countermeasures, missile guidance, 
digital computing and eventually space technology. Throughout the 
1950s, the laboratory formed a crucial component of the monist 
programme. The EL's Components Section was charged with ensuring 
29. For a discussion of catastrophic failure versus degradation failure, see J. C. Cluley, 
Electronic Equipment Reliability(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), 100-102. 
30. NAC, RG 24, accession, 1983-84/049, vol. 1664, file 1950-123-7, part 2, C. Soucy, 
"The 'Project MATURE' Concept of the Design and Production Requirements for 
Reliable and Maintainable Military Electronics Equipment," presented to the Third 
Institute of Radio Engineers Convention, Toronto, Canada, 8 October 1958,5. 
31. Soucy, fig. 2. 
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the robustness and performance of individual electronic parts and with 
advising the Armed Services and industry on their findings.32 Through its 
provision of the Secretariat for the Electronic Components Research and 
Development Committee, the Components Section also tied DRTE into 
the most widespread reliability programme for electronic parts in Canada, 
and linked it to similar efforts in the U.K. and the U.S. with which the 
committee coordinated its activities.33 By the closing years of the decade, 
however, the affinities of the Electronics Laboratory for the dualist 
programme had been instantiated in the organization and layout of the 
lab. In 1954, it added a second section alongside the Components Section 
and dedicated to electronic circuits, particularly those involving transis-
tors. By 1957 the new section had grown to include several subdivi-
sions—Transistor Measurements and Radio Frequency Receivers, Digital 
Techniques, and Advanced Circuit Research.34 The foundational work 
that went on there was recognized in the new title given to the section: 
Basic Circuits. 
Like the Components Section, Basic Circuits worked to combine 
extreme robustness with high performance. But it searched for this 
combination in collocations of electronic parts rather than in the individ-
ual parts themselves. Drawing materially on the robust parts that flowed 
from the Components group, the section struggled throughout the 1950s, 
during the height of the reliability crisis, to fashion robust circuits.35 Its 
engineers developed their approach mainly through a number of projects 
undertaken for the Royal Canadian Air Force, including the Doppler 
radar for the CF-105 (the Avro Arrow). For nearly six years, the members 
of Basic Circuits worked on reconciling the functional requirements of 
radar with the robustness required for supersonic flight. It enlisted 
Simpson's team, with its connections to CAMESA and its involvement in 
the monist programme, to carefully screen individual components.36 It 
called on members of Basic Circuits to transistorize the design. For over 
a year, guided by the reliability demands of Chester Soucy and the Air 
Material Command, a group of technicians and a design team led by 
engineer Colin Franklin struggled to combine electronic stability and 
temperature compensation in the components with the necessary radiation 
32. Goodspeed, 203. 
33. NAC, RG 41, vol. 110, file 3-23, part 1, "Defence Research Board: Electronic 
Component Development Committee, Terms of Reference," 12 February 1954. 
34. NAC, RG 24, accession 89-90/205, P.M. Thompson, "The Graphic Nomenclature of 
Transistors," (n.d.) Defence Research Board, Canada, EL Memorandum No. 5059-50B. 
35. Goodspeed, 203. 
36. Communications Researh Centre, Frank Davies Papers, Letter from John N. Barry to 
Frank T. Davies, "Doppler Navigator Development," (16 October 1973): 5. 
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characteristics for the radar. Understanding the dire consequences of 
malfunctions in navigation systems during supersonic flight, Franklin and 
his team sought to reconcile radar fidelity with electronic reliability.37 
With the cancellation of the aircraft in 1959, the Doppler project ended 
and the Doppler Section was transformed, with much of its staff and 
expertise intact, into the Satellite Section to begin work on S-27. 
The dualist approach, developed for the exigencies of guided missiles 
and supersonic flight, now dominated the design, construction, and 
testing of the S-27 satellite. As Andrew Molozzi, one of the principal 
engineers for the project, asserted: "The approach taken placed particular 
emphasis on the integrated design of the circuitry, that is, components in 
the circuit rather than on individual component parts alone."38 Robust 
electronic parts were still crucial to the project, and members of the 
Satellite Section sought to ensure their reliability by incorporating only 
'proven' parts into the satellite instrumentation. But alongside these 
attempts to identify and create robust electronic parts was an attempt to 
isolate optimal configurations, 'preferred' circuits. All circuits for S-27 
were tested over a temperature range of -50C to +75C even though 
thermal design studies and tests had shown that actual payload tempera-
tures would only vary between -7C and +45C. The same circuits were 
tested over simultaneous voltage fluctuations of between 25 percent and 
50 percent, despite the fact that the same studies and tests had shown that 
voltages would be held to ±5 percent.39 Test soundings from the ground 
determined whether the robust circuits that emerged from the process 
could adequately meet the ionographic demands of the mission. And the 
rigorous process of testing and examination then continued outward to 
larger and larger assemblies, eventually involving the entire payload. 
An interesting irony emerged from this process and from the instrument 
it produced. The concepts and practices that DRTE technicians and engi-
neers employed to ensure the reliability of military electronic equipment, 
the tenets of the dualist philosophy of reliability that they had been 
developing under the intense pressures of the Cold War, received their 
greatest justification, not through the reliable deployment of missiles or 
aircraft, but from the production of scientific records. In the days and 
weeks following the successful launch of S-27, letters of congratulations 
37. Barry, 2-3. 
38. A.R. Molozzi, "Instrumentation of the Ionospheric Sounder Contained in the 
Satellite 1962 Beta Alpha (Alouette)," Space Research IV: Proceedings of the Fourth 
International Space Science Symposium, Warsaw (1964), 427. 
39. Molozzi, 417; NAC, RG 24, ace. 83-84/167, box 7315, file 0204-01, vol. 2, John 
Mar, "Notes on Fifth Meeting of Topside Sounder Working Group at CRPL 12 October 
1960: Appendix C." 
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poured into the office of Frank Davies, now DRTE's Chief Superinten-
dent. Among those letters came one from the British physicist J.A. 
Ratcliffe, colleague and friend of Sir Edward Appleton and, next to him, 
the world's senior ionospheric specialist. From his office at the Radio 
Research Station of the British Directorate of Scientific and Industrial 
Research in Slough, Ratcliffe began: 
There is now no doubt at all that everybody here feels that you and your people 
have done a most wonderful piece of work in the making of this equipment. None 
of us has ever seen such good ionograms even when taken from the ground. It is 
quite amazing that results of this kind should have been produced, and even more 
amazing that they should have been produced by a group of workers who have 
never before put an experiment into a satellite. I should imagine that this experi-
ment of yours is one of the most complicated and ambitious that has yet been 
made.40 
Given the inexperience of DRTE in satellite construction, the achieve-
ment surprised Ratcliffe and others. It should surprise us a little less. 
Everywhere around the technicians and engineers of the S-27 project was 
a culture of reliability. S-27 was, from its beginnings, immersed in a 
formidable cultural apparatus, elaborated in the 1950s, and dedicated to 
the construction of reliable electronic instruments. Parts screening, 
testing-to-failure, derating, advanced circuit design, centrifuge tests, 
vacuum and thermal chambers—these were the conceptual and material 
expressions of a specific philosophy of reliability championed in military 
circles in the late 1950s and early 1960s, embodied in the organization 
and activities of DRTE, and directed towards (among other projects) the 
construction of S-27. The entire physical and cultural infrastructure that 
ensured the reliable functioning of military technology, that transformed 
potentially untrustworthy electronic entities into dependable military 
electronics, was marshalled towards the construction of a reliable scien-
tific instrument and received its ultimate validation from the ionograms it 
helped produce. 
Conclusion 
So we end where we began—with ionograms and satellites. But we 
have benefited from this detour through laboratory cultures. For the sci-
entists, engineers and technicians at DRTE in the late 1950s, the S-27 
project was as much a culmination of scientific and technological tradi-
tions as it was a starting point for future satellite communications. For the 
atmospheric physicists and radio engineers of RPL, S-27 was rooted in a 
40. NAC, RG 24, accession 1983-84/167, box 7316, file 0204-01, part 6, letter from J.A. 
Ratcliffe to F.T. Davies, 9 October 1962. Original emphasis. 
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research programme stretching back to the wartime North Atlantic, to the 
shortwave radio blackouts that plagued high-northern latitudes in the 
early Cold War, and to the peculiar scientific images that promised to 
overcome them. For the engineers and technicians of the Electronics 
Laboratory, the satellite had potentially very different linkages. Tied to 
Doppler navigation systems, high-speed switching circuits and supersonic 
aircraft, the satellite participated in a tradition of cold-war electrical 
engineering obsessed with how to make technologies trustworthy. The 
same beliefs and practices designed to hold military technology in a state 
of constant readiness, to render it dependable in the impending and 
punishing environment of nuclear war, helped safeguard the reliable 
production of ionograms in the harsh conditions of space. 
My suggestion that we focus on S-27 rather than Alouette, on what the 
satellite was in the late 1950s and early 1960s rather than what it would 
become in future decades, might be open to misinterpretation. So let me 
be clear about what I have not been arguing. I am not arguing that the 
satellite did not represent some sort of rupture in ionospheric research for 
the members of RPL, or that the satellite designers did not have commu-
nications satellites in mind when developing S-27. Clearly they did. Nor 
am I arguing for a view of that would turn the series of satellites engi-
neered by DRTE into a kind of technological Potemkin Village, with 
each instrument standing in isolation rather than in series. What I have 
argued for is a view of the S-27 project that puts aside one of the most 
constant and central preoccupations in the history of Canadian science 
and technology: its obsession with innovations, discoveries and inven-
tions, its constant search for success stories. 
Some nations need scant justification as foci for scholarship; they 
command their own legitimation. Cold war science and engineering too 
have their icons. ICBMs, nuclear weapons, subatomic research, solid-
state electronics—these are the material and cognitive foundations for 
innumerable aspects of that conflict and the world it helped shape.41 But 
as I suggested at the outset of this paper, when taken seriously and on 
their own terms, the laboratories of DRTE suggest that the history of 
Canadian science and technology can also command our attention. In 
details that may seem mundane—the reading of ionograms, the design of 
electronic circuits—the laboratories of DRTE argue forcefully for how 
science and technology were used again and again to carve out authority 
41. Albert Moyer has pointed to the dominance in the historiography of modern physics 
of what he terms "Los Alamos-based histories," studies that take the wartime work of 
nuclear physicists as both the culmination of prewar developments and the birth of 
postwar patterns. See Albert Moyer, "History of Physics," Osiris 1 (1985): 163-182. 
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and autonomy under the totalizing pressures of the Cold War. Iono-
spheric research and electrical engineering alike simultaneously 
reinforced and threatened the emerging geopolitical order. They show us 
that if the principal means of prosecuting the Cold War were technologi-
cal and scientific, then the means of fighting its totalizing tendencies 
were scientific and technological as well. Exploring these struggles, 
waged across the postwar globe, moves us away from the conceit that the 
only stories to be told are those centred, directly or by proxy, on Wash-
ington or Moscow. What is more, it sheds new light on the perennial 
question of what is Canadian about Canadian science and technology.42 It 
does so, not by using that question to guide a search for essences, but by 
making the question itself the subject of historical investigation.43 What 
did the members of the laboratory see as distinctive about their research? 
How did those views engage, subvert, or transform understandings of the 
nation? Or, put differently, how can we see the idea of the nation take 
shape in the workings of a laboratory? In seeking answers to those ques-
tions, we can speak to much wider concerns in the history of science and 
technology. Like Proust witnessing the entire town of Combray spring 
from his teacup, we can begin to see the nation inside the laboratory. 
There is metaphysics in our histories, if we only care to look. 
42. For a classic study of this question, see Trevor Levere, "What is Canadian about 
Science in Canadian History?" in Science, Technology, and Canadian History, eds. R. A. 
Jarrell and N. R. Ball (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980), 14-22. 
43. Gabrielle Hecht has urged just such an approach in her study of nuclear power in 
post-war France. See The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity After 
World War II (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998). On Canada, see Suzanne Zeller's masterful 
work Inventing Canada: Early Victorian Science and the Idea of a Transcontinental 
Nation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). 
